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INTRODUCTION 
In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself 
in Court,1 Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against 
congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal 
statutes.  They conclude that Congress, or a single House of 
Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in 
court even when the executive branch has decided not to do so but 
may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and 
disciplinary powers.2 
Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support 
of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but 
related features of the Constitution.  “First, the Constitution 
precludes Congress from having a direct role in the implementation 
of federal law, providing instead that the executive branch ‘shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”3  Second, “defense of 
federal statutes by the House or the Senate violates an additional 
 
 † Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  Thanks to Gary Lawson and Bill Marshall for advice on the preparation of this 
Comment and to Paul Gugluizza and Richard Murphy for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
 1 Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court,  
99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014). 
 2 Id. at 576. 
 3 Id. at 574 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
2014] A COMMENT ON GROVE AND DEVINS 167 
constitutional norm: bicameralism.”4 
Grove and Devins argue that bicameralism does not apply to 
litigation in support of congressional investigations, such as 
enforcement of subpoenas and punishment of contempt, because of 
the Constitution’s provision in Article I, section 5, clause 2, granting 
each House of Congress the power to determine its own rules and 
punish its members.5  While I agree with Grove and Devins that 
Congress has the power to litigate in support of its investigations, I 
disagree with them over the basis for this power.  The provision of 
Article I upon which they rely refers exclusively to internal 
congressional proceedings.  Rather, as elaborated below, the power 
to investigate, enforce subpoenas and punish contempt derives from 
Congress’s core legislative power.6 
Although I admire Grove and Devins’s article very much, I find 
the constitutional analysis that led to their conclusion against 
congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal 
statutes unconvincing.  Their focus on bicameralism and on 
Congress’s internal rulemaking disciplinary powers is misguided.  
This leads them to ignore fundamental principles concerning 
Congress’s investigative powers and American separation of powers. 
While Grove and Devins present illuminating historical and 
institutional reasons for skepticism about congressional power and 
competence to defend federal statutes in court, the bulk of their 
analysis is not grounded in law.  Rather, the bulk of the article 
comprises (potentially persuasive) normative political and historical 
analysis.  Much as some of us would like it to be so, normative analysis 
is insufficient to establish constitutional doctrine, especially regarding 
structural and procedural matters.  Just because a chamber or office 
is illsuited for a particular task does not mean that it is 
unconstitutional for that body or official to exercise the power.  The 
 
 4 Id.  Although they did not make the argument, an obvious corollary to the 
bicameralism argument is that litigation by Congress would also violate the Constitution’s 
Presentment Clause because everything that must be done bicamerally must also be 
presented to the President. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or 
Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of 
the United States.”).  This does not mean that everything that both Houses of Congress do 
must be presented to the President.  Concurrent resolutions are not presented to the 
President because they do not have the force of law.  By contrast, joint resolutions do have 
the force of law, and like bills, must be presented to the President.  See JOHN V. SULLIVAN, 
HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-49, at 5–8 (2007). 
 5 Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 576–77. 
 6 See generally William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781 (2004).  Marshall explains that the Supreme Court has 
affirmed Congress’s power to conduct investigations as “inherent in the legislative 
process.”  Id. at 797.  The power to investigate would be of no use if Congress could not go 
to court to enforce its subpoenas and punish contempt. 
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contrary conclusion would attribute a degree of perfection to the 
Framers’ handiwork that is belied, for example, by the Constitution’s 
support of slavery and its failure to grant women the right to vote or 
by the Framers’ creation of the blatantly undemocratic Senate and 
method for selecting the President.  The Framers did not achieve 
perfection as constitutional drafters. 
This Comment proceeds as follows.  Part I addresses the question 
whether Congress may litigate in defense of the constitutionality of 
federal statutes.  Part I.A refutes the argument that congressional 
litigation to support the constitutionality of federal statutes violates 
the Take Care Clause.  Part I.B similarly refutes the argument that 
such litigation by Congress violates the Constitution’s requirement of 
bicameralism.  Part I.C raises, and rejects, the possibility that 
congressional litigation violates the Appointments Clause.  Part II 
addresses Grove and Devins’s arguments in favor of congressional 
power to litigate in support of its investigatory power.  While agreeing 
with Grove and Devins’s conclusion in favor of such power, I disagree 
in this Part with the constitutional basis they present.   
I 
LITIGATION IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL 
STATUTES 
Contrary to Grove and Devins’s view, there is no constitutional 
provision that can fairly be interpreted to prohibit Congress or one 
House of Congress from defending the constitutionality of a duly 
enacted federal statute.  The Constitution’s assignment to the 
President of the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” says nothing about Congress’s role in ensuring that duly 
enacted laws are enforced by the executive branch or evaluated fairly 
by the federal courts for constitutionality.7  In fact, because it imposes 
a duty on the President and is not a grant of power, it cannot be read 
to support any limitation on Congress.  Second, the Constitution’s 
bicameralism (and presentment) requirements apply only to 
legislative action, and litigation in support of the constitutionality of 
federal statutes is not legislative action. While these points may not 
prove that Congress may engage in litigation, they refute Grove and 
Devins’s constitutional bases for rejecting it.  For reasons elaborated 
below, although it is a close case whether Congress has the 
constitutional power to defend federal statutes in court, ultimately 
the constitutional arguments in favor of congressional power are 
stronger than the arguments against. 
An additional comment on Grove and Devins’s historical analysis 
is necessary at this point.  They present persuasive evidence that 
 
 7 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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historically, Congress did not assert the power to litigate the 
constitutionality of federal statutes until 1983, when the Supreme 
Court “with virtually no explanation”8 allowed Congress to intervene 
in support of the legislative veto at issue in INS v. Chadha.9  How 
important is this history to understanding the separation of powers 
implications of congressional litigation in support of the 
constitutionality of statutes?  It is certainly true that historical practice 
can illuminate the meaning of constitutional text, and Grove and 
Devins’s evidence establishes that Congress did not attempt to 
become a party to such litigation between 1789 and 1983 and passed 
laws during this period that imply a belief that only the executive 
branch had authority to do so.10 
This history is not conclusive in this case for the simple reason 
that the history does not appear to be sufficiently connected to the 
constitutional provisions upon which Grove and Devins rely.  There is 
no evidence that the reason Congress did not assert litigating 
authority in the first 194 years under the Constitution was because of 
its understanding of the meaning of the Take Care Clause or the 
requirement of bicameralism.  It may have reflected Congress’s 
general understanding of separation of powers, but as the analysis 
below explains, general principles of separation of powers are not 
sufficient to prevent Congress from litigating the constitutionality of a 
federal statute when the executive branch declines to do so. 
A. The Take Care Clause, the Vesting Clause, and General 
Principles of Separation of Powers 
Grove and Devins initially rely on the Take Care Clause to reject 
congressional power to litigate in support of federal statutes.11  This is 
an expressio unius argument—since the Take Care Clause grants the 
President the power to execute the laws, Congress may not engage in 
such activity.  Their argument is somewhat ironic because the 
necessity for congressional litigation arises from the President’s 
decision not to take care that a particular law is faithfully executed.12 
The problem with this aspect of Grove and Devins’s analysis is 
that the Take Care Clause is not a grant of power to the President 
 
 8 Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 575. 
 9 See id. at 583–93 (discussing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 
 10 See id. at 578. 
 11 See id. at 574. 
 12  Grove and Devins wisely avoid the thorny issues surrounding whether the 
President should veto any bill that contains even a single provision that, in the opinion of 
the President, is unconstitutional, and whether the Take Care Clause must be read in light 
of the President’s oath to “preserve, protect and defend” the Constitution so that the 
President also has a duty to not execute unconstitutional laws.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 
8.  But this controversy is obviously lurking in the background. 
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(that can then be read to negate power in Congress).13  Rather, it is 
phrased as a constitutional duty and is understood as such even by 
strong advocates of the unitary executive theory.14  Grove and Devins 
might have done better to rely on the Vesting Clause of Article II, 
which vests the executive power in the President.15  If the Vesting 
Clause is understood as granting the President the exclusive power to 
execute the law, the next question would be whether litigation in 
support of the constitutionality of a federal statute is “execution” of 
the law.  Grove and Devins do not mention Article II’s Vesting Clause 
in their article and thus ignore substantial constitutional arguments 
in favor of their position. 
Even if they had relied upon the Vesting Clause, Grove and 
Devins would have been unable to make their case based on the law 
of separation of powers in the United States.  Although advocates of 
broad executive power would like it to be so understood, the Vesting 
Clause of Article II has not been relied upon in the case law to deny 
Congress power to engage in what might be viewed as meddling in 
executive affairs.  Further, under current understandings of the 
constitutional demarcation of the executive power, there is reason to 
doubt that defending the constitutionality of a statute is an executive 
function reserved exclusively to the President. 
In order to understand why neither the Take Care Clause nor 
the Vesting Clause establishes that Congress may not litigate in 
support of federal statutes, a brief explanation of the general 
principles of American separation of powers is necessary.16  The 
general principle of separation of powers as legal doctrine is very 
weak in federal law.  Rather, separation of powers constraints are 
contained by and large in the numerous particular structural and 
procedural provisions of the Constitution.  While many of the 
Constitution’s procedural and structural provisions, such as the 
Appointments Clause17 and the Bicameralism and Presentment 
 
 13 Although Grove and Devins do not mention it, their analysis is similar to dormant 
or negative Commerce Clause analysis.  The Commerce Clause, a grant of power to 
Congress, is understood as taking power away from the states.  Grove and Devins 
(mis)interpret the Take Care Clause as a grant of power to the President, implying a 
diminution of the power of Congress. 
 14 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1198 n.221 (1992).  They attribute this 
view to a conversation with my colleague Gary Lawson.  See also Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 583 
(1994) (arguing that the Vesting Clause, not the Take Care Clause, is the source of the 
President’s power but that the Take Care Clause confirms that the executive power has 
been vested in the President). 
 15 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 583. 
 16 The analysis that follows is drawn from Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive 
Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 467 (2011). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Clauses,18 are strictly enforced by the federal courts, if no procedural 
or structural provision applies, the inquiry shifts to a relatively lenient 
standard asking whether a branch has been unduly hampered in its 
ability to carry out its constitutionally assigned functions. 
The Constitution’s Vesting Clauses have not been treated as 
procedural or structural provisions to be strictly enforced.19  The only 
cases in which a Vesting Clause has figured prominently are those 
involving judicial power under Article III, but even then, protection 
of Article III jurisdiction pursuant to Article III’s Vesting Clause has 
not been very strict.20  The Vesting Clause of Article II, which reserves 
the federal executive power to the President of the United States, is 
too general and open-ended for the sort of enforcement that 
characterizes American separation of powers doctrine.21  There is 
simply no clear constitutional boundary between the powers of the 
legislative branch and the powers of the executive branch. 
Strict enforcement of the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II 
would require courts to determine the nature of each exercise of 
federal power and then to prohibit the wrong branch from exercising 
it.  This would transform American separation of powers doctrine 
into a judicial hammer for invalidating all manner of congressional 
and executive action that appears to belong to the other branch.  If 
the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses were important to separation of 
powers analysis, congressional litigation would be subject to the 
charge that because litigation is executive by nature, Congress may 
not litigate.  While this sort of analysis may be attractive to those who 
do not like the administrative state or believe that Congress meddles 
too much in executive affairs, it does not represent the law of 
separation of powers in the United States. 
Under a proper understanding of separation of powers doctrine 
in American law, the first question should be whether congressional 
litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates 
a specific procedural or structural provision of the Constitution.  
Because there is no such provision, the next question would be 
whether Congress’s action “‘violates the principle of separation of 
powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive 
 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 & 3. 
 19 See Beermann, supra note 16, at 491–94. 
 20 See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (allowing non–Article III adjudication 
of federal statutory private rights dispute between commodities broker and customer). 
 21 Unless a specific structural or procedural provision of the Constitution is involved, 
restrictions on presidential power are rarely found to violate the separation of powers.  A 
recent exception is Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. 
Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010), in which restrictions on the President’s ability to remove members 
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board were held to violate separation of 
powers. 
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Branch.’”22  In slightly different language, the correct doctrinal 
question is whether congressional litigation in support of the 
constitutionality of federal statutes unduly hampers another branch 
from performing its constitutional function. 
The general separation of powers principle of the Constitution 
points strongly in favor of congressional litigation in support of the 
constitutionality of federal law.  It does not remotely hamper the 
executive branch from fulfilling its constitutional function.  If 
anything, presidential refusal to defend the constitutionality of a 
federal statute hampers Congress’s ability to perform its legislative 
function.  Congress depends on the President to enforce the statutes 
it passes.  The only constitutionally specified remedy Congress has for 
presidential refusal to enforce or defend its laws is impeachment and 
removal, a tool that, until the impeachment of President Clinton, has 
been used only in extremis. 
Congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of a 
federal statute does not intrude at all on, much less “unduly hamper,” 
any presidential function.  It does not limit the President’s veto 
power—even if Congress chooses to defend a statute that was passed 
over a veto, the President lacks the power to again veto a bill that has 
been repassed by the required two-thirds majority.  It does not 
prevent the President from taking care that the laws are faithfully 
executed since it occurs only when the President has decided not to 
defend (or sometimes, not to enforce) a law.  It does not prevent the 
President from honoring the oath of office since it is Congress, not 
the President, that is defending the law that the President believes is 
unconstitutional.  In fact, the Obama administration’s strategy 
regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was the 
episode that apparently motivated Grove and Devins to write, may 
have been the worst of both worlds––violating the oath by enforcing 
an unconstitutional law and violating the Take Care Clause by 
acquiescing in judicial invalidation without putting up a fight. 
Congress’s role in litigating in support of the constitutionality of 
enacted statutes might be analogized to citizen standing under the 
False Claims Act, which was approved by the Supreme Court almost 
fifteen years ago.23  The analogy is not perfect, but when Congress 
litigates the constitutionality of a statute, it is advancing a government 
interest that undoubtedly could be pursued by the executive branch, 
just as False Claims Act litigants were found to have standing to assert 
claims that belonged to the federal government.  Congress is not 
attempting to create new legal rights or duties but rather to ensure 
 
 22 Beermann, supra note 16, at 482 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 
(1988)). 
 23 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (1999). 
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that those already on the books are validated against constitutional 
challenge. 
B. Bicameralism 
Grove and Devins almost follow the separation of powers 
framework spelled out above when they invoke the Constitution’s 
bicameralism requirement as applied in Chadha.24  Citing and 
quoting Chadha, they argue that: 
[U]nilateral defense by the House or Senate counsel is deeply 
problematic. The bicameral structure of Congress is a crucial part 
of our constitutional scheme of separated powers. As the Supreme 
Court stated in INS v. Chadha, “[W]hen the Framers intended to 
authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its 
prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely 
defined the procedure for such action.” “These exceptions are 
narrow, explicit, and separately justified . . . .”25 
Because it relies on a particular structural provision of the 
Constitution, this argument is a step in the right direction.  The 
problem is that Grove and Devins never analyze whether the 
Constitution’s bicameralism requirement applies to congressional 
litigation.  As the Chadha Court recognized, bicameralism (and 
presentment) apply only when Congress takes legislative action.  The 
Chadha Court defined legislative action as “action that ha[s] the 
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.”26  This is a practical 
definition, requiring Congress to follow the Constitution’s legislative 
procedures whenever it takes action with legal effects. 
Congressional litigation is not legislative action because it does 
not have the purpose or effect of altering anyone’s legal rights either 
inside or outside the legislative branch.  The law was altered when 
Congress passed the bill and it was either signed into law by the 
President or repassed by the required two-thirds majority after a 
presidential veto.  The alteration of legal rights and duties occurred 
when the legislative process was completed.  A judgment by a federal 
court on the constitutionality of a federal statute would also alter 
legal rights, which the federal courts may do if they meet the 
procedural and structural constitutional provisions that apply to 
them,27 but the mere process of engaging in litigation has no legal 
effect. 
 
 24 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 25 Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 627. 
 26 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. 
 27 The main procedural and structural provisions that apply to the federal courts are 
proper appointment of the courts’ judges and a case or controversy within Article III 
jurisdiction. 
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The Chadha Court understood that non-legislative action does 
not require bicameralism and presentment.  In an exceedingly 
important footnote, the Court rejected the argument that the 
Attorney General was required to use bicameralism and presentment 
to alter Chadha’s legal rights—when the Attorney General enforces 
the law, it is not legislation, and bicameralism and presentment 
simply do not apply.28  To be sure, this footnote refers to action by 
the executive branch, not Congress, but the principle remains the 
same—bicameralism and presentment apply only to legislative action 
by Congress, not to non-legislative action by anyone.29 
In sum, bicameralism does not support Grove and Devins’s 
conclusion that Congress may not litigate in support of the 
constitutionality of federal statutes. 
C. The Appointments Clause 
A plausible argument against congressional litigation to defend 
the constitutionality of federal statutes lies in the Appointments 
Clause as understood by the Supreme Court in decisions like Buckley 
v. Valeo30 and Freytag v. Commissioner.31  In those decisions, the Court 
held that only officers of the United States may exercise significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.32  Members of 
Congress are not, and cannot constitutionally be, officers of the 
United States.33 
If litigation in support of statutory constitutionality involves the 
exercise of significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
 
 28 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954 n.16. The separation of powers provisions that apply to 
action by the Attorney General are two: the executive branch must act pursuant to a valid 
delegation of power by Congress and the officials enforcing the law must be appointed 
properly, i.e. pursuant to procedures of the Appointments Clause. 
 29 Properly understood, this footnote in Chadha, combined with nondelegation 
principles, leaves open the possibility that litigation by the executive branch is an 
executive function while litigation by Congress is a legislative function, requiring 
bicameralism and presentment.  But that reasoning applies only when the action by 
Congress meets the definition of legislation.  Litigation in support of the constitutionality 
of federal statutes (or in furtherance of legislative information gathering) does not, by any 
stretch of the imagination, meet that definition.  This is not like rulemaking, where 
Congress could pass a statute with the very same text as an agency rule, and Congress 
would be legislating while the agency promulgating the rule would have been executing 
the law delegating the power to the agency to make the rule.  Justice John Paul Stevens’s 
dissent in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), depended 
on the contrary view, that the nature of governmental action, and not the identity of those 
taking the action, determine what power is being exercised.  See id. at 488–89 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting). 
 30 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 31 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 32 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919–20. 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). 
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States, then such litigation by Congress or any subset of Congress is 
unconstitutional.  Bicameralism is irrelevant to this analysis—even if 
both Houses of Congress agreed to litigate in support of the 
constitutionality of a federal statute and present their resolution to 
the President, and even if for some strange reason the President 
signed such a resolution, if litigation is the exercise of significant 
authority pursuant to the law, Congress could not do it because the 
power would be reserved to officers of the United States.  This is a 
stronger constitutional argument against congressional power to 
litigate than the ones Grove and Devins make. 
While I recognize that there are strong arguments to the 
contrary, in my view, litigation in support of the constitutionality of a 
statute is not among those activities that can be performed only by 
officers of the United States.  It would be different if Congress 
initiated litigation by bringing a civil enforcement action or seeking 
an indictment under a federal statute that the President had decided 
not to enforce.  These are the quintessential functions that may be 
performed only by officers of the United States.  However, even in 
the context of a particular case, merely arguing in favor of the 
constitutionality of a statute does not have the sort of effect on private 
parties that requires action by an officer of the United States.  Rather, 
litigating the constitutionality of a statute is more like the function of 
providing recommendations without actual legal effect that has been 
found not to require officer status by the D.C. Circuit.34  Nothing that 
Congress does when it briefs and argues a case involves the exercise 
of significant authority pursuant to the law.  If the D.C. Circuit is 
correct that administrative law judges with the power to issue 
recommended decisions need not be officers of the United States,35 
then arguing to a court on behalf of the constitutionality of a federal 
statute clearly does not require officer status. 
For these reasons, the Constitution does not support Grove and 
Devins’s conclusion that Congress may not litigate the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.  Disallowing Congress from 
defending the constitutionality of federal statutes would also be 
terrible policy because it would allow the executive branch to defy 
Congress and would authorize the President in effect to unilaterally 
amend or repeal duly enacted federal laws that depend on executive 
action for enforcement.  As a functional matter, allowing Congress to 
litigate is, if anything, restorative of the separation of powers.  It 
prevents the President from shirking the duties imposed by the Take 
Care Clause and it confines the President’s veto power to the 
parameters spelled out in the Constitution. 
 
 34 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 35 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143. 
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As tempting as it is to rely on this normative line of argument in 
support of my conclusion that Congress may litigate the 
constitutionality of federal statutes, it would be improper to do so.  
This was Justice Byron White’s argument in dissent in Chadha in 
support of the legislative veto: the legislative veto restores the proper 
balance because it allows Congress to control delegations of 
legislative power to the executive branch and ensures that Congress 
and the President agree to exercises of delegated power.36  One 
lesson of Chadha and subsequent decisions is that this form of 
argument is not consistent with the law of separation of powers under 
the United States Constitution.  When a particular procedural or 
structural provision of the Constitution applies, the balance among 
the branches created by alternative arrangements is irrelevant. 
* * * 
In sum, neither the Take Care Clause nor the Constitution’s 
bicameralism and presentment requirements render unconstitutional 
congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of a federal 
statute.  Further, Article II’s Vesting Clause and the Appointments 
Clause do not alter this conclusion, and congressional litigation does 
not violate general separation of powers norms.  Moreover, in a 
purely normative sense, allowing Congress to litigate the 
constitutionality of a federal statute when the President has decided 
not to do so is consistent with separation of powers because it 
prevents the President from, in effect, vetoing a law that has already 
become valid and because it supports the President’s duty to take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. 
II 
LITIGATION IN SUPPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Grove and Devins are correct that Congress has the power to go 
to federal court to enforce its subpoenas and punish contempt of 
Congress, although they have not accurately explained why that does 
not violate the separation of powers.  The case against this power may 
at times appear stronger than the argument against congressional 
power to litigate in support of federal statutes because congressional 
exercise of this power, in some circumstances, threatens the 
functioning of the executive branch.  Nevertheless, I agree with 
Grove and Devins that Congress may litigate to enforce its subpoenas 
and punish contempt, and it may do so unicamerally without 
presenting any resolution to the President. 
Grove and Devins rely primarily upon Congress’s rulemaking 
and disciplinary powers for their conclusion that each House of 
Congress may independently litigate in support of congressional 
 
 36 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 972–73 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
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investigations.  Article I, section 5, clause 2 provides: “Each House 
may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for 
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel 
a Member.”37  In their view, under this provision of Article I:  
Each chamber may even hold nonmembers in 
contempt for failing to cooperate with an 
investigation. . . .  Article I expressly allows each 
chamber to act unilaterally in this context. To 
make this Article I power effective, each chamber 
must have the authority to litigate any matters 
arising out of its investigations, including by 
enforcing subpoenas. . . .   
. . . . 
The power of Congress to seek and enforce 
informational demands, including the power to 
punish for contempt, arises out of the power of 
Congress to investigate.38 
The problem for Grove and Devins here is that the provision of 
Article I upon which they rely refers exclusively to internal 
congressional matters.  Article I makes clear that each House of 
Congress may independently make internal rules (without 
bicameralism or presentment) and that Congress may punish or 
expel its members without going to court.  If this provision grants 
“each chamber” the power to “hold nonmembers in contempt for 
failing to cooperate with an investigation,” as Grove and Devins claim, 
it is only with regard to disciplinary investigations of members of 
Congress, not in support of investigations in aid of legislation.  The 
power to investigate and punish the misconduct of its members does 
not give Congress the power to litigate to enforce subpoenas against 
executive branch officials or private parties when the investigation is 
not related to internal discipline. 
Each House’s power to investigate matters not related to internal 
discipline and to litigate in support of such investigations derives not 
from the power of each House to make and enforce rules but rather 
from Congress’s core legislative power.39  Congress’s power to 
legislate would be seriously hampered if it had to depend on the 
executive branch to gather the information necessary to make 
 
 37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 38 Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 574–75, 597–98 (footnotes omitted). 
 39 See Marshall, supra note 6, at 797 (citing, inter alia, Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178, 187 (1957)); see also TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 4 (2014) (“The inherent contempt 
power is not specified in a statute or constitutional provision, but has been deemed 
implicit in the Constitution’s grant to Congress of all legislative powers.”). 
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informed legislative decisions.  This helps explain, as Bill Marshall 
reports, why the British Parliament’s power to investigate government 
operations was wellestablished by 1689, and was mimicked by the 
Massachusetts legislature by 1722.40  While this history cannot 
establish the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, it 
illuminates the general understanding of the powers of legislatures in 
the British tradition.41 
When a congressional investigation is directed against the 
executive branch, the case against this congressional power is 
stronger than the case against congressional power to litigate in 
support of the constitutionality of federal statutes.  Congress’s power 
to enforce its subpoenas and punish contempt is likely to present a 
much more serious threat to general separation of powers norms 
than congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of 
duly enacted federal statutes.  Congress’s use of its subpoena power 
to investigate the executive branch, as Justice Antonin Scalia so 
eloquently explained in his 1988 dissent in Morrison v. Olson (the 
independent counsel case),42 threatens the ability of the President to 
resist congressional overreaching.  The saving grace in this process is 
that a federal court can deny enforcement if the executive presents a 
valid legal basis for non-enforcement (or a court can grant a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus if Congress seeks to punish contempt 
without going to court43).  Although the threat to the executive 
branch remains strong when the President has good, but not legally 
sufficient, reasons to resist, a judicial determination that the 
President’s reasons are not legally sufficient is likely to reflect a 
judgment that, in the particular case, the President’s interest in 
preserving confidentiality is outweighed by Congress’s legitimate 
interest in information gathering for legislative purposes (or for the 
potential exercise of its impeachment and removal powers).  This 
should be a sufficient safeguard against congressional litigation that 
might “unduly hamper” the operation of the Executive Branch. 
 
 40 See Marshall, supra note 6, at 785–86. 
 41 In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected Parliament’s powers as the model for the powers of Congress to investigate and 
punish contempt.  It did, however, recognize such powers as “necessary to enable either 
House of Congress to exercise successfully their function of legislation.”  Id. at 189.  This 
power is limited to matters that might conceivably lead to the enactment of legislation and 
cannot be used merely to pry into people’s private affairs.  Kilbourn may no longer be 
good law for some of its points, but “the case continues to be cited for the proposition 
that the House has no power to probe into private affairs.”  See GARVEY & DOLAN, supra 
note 39, at 10. 
 42 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712–15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 43 See GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 39, at 11 & n.83 (citing Marshall v. Gordon, 243 
U.S. 521 (1917); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Theodore Sky, 
Judicial Review of Congressional Investigations: Is There an Alternative to Contempt?, 31 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 399, 400 n.3 (1962)). 
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Congressional investigation of private parties presents less of a 
separation of powers problem because it does not threaten the 
integrity of the executive branch.  The argument against 
congressional action aimed at private parties depends instead on the 
argument that subpoena- and contempt enforcement constitutes the 
exercise of significant authority pursuant to the law and thus may be 
conducted only by officers of the United States.  This argument does 
not succeed because Congress is not enforcing any federal law but 
rather is acting in furtherance of its core constitutional legislative 
function.  It would cripple Congress’s ability to legislate effectively if 
it had to depend on the executive branch for information gathering 
concerning private activities. 
I recognize that a powerful argument against this conclusion may 
be made based on Chadha and the Appointments Clause principles 
discussed above.  When Congress seeks to enforce a subpoena or 
punish contempt, it is certainly affecting the legal rights and duties of 
persons outside of the legislative branch, which is the Chadha Court’s 
definition of legislative action.  It may also appear to be exercising 
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States, 
especially where contempt of Congress is statutorily defined.  
Information must be turned over and imprisonment or fines may be 
imposed as penalties for contempt.  While Congress could probably 
not impose penalties legislatively, because such action would violate 
the prohibition against bills of attainder, Chadha counsels against 
unilateral congressional action with effects outside of the legislative 
branch. 
Despite the power of these arguments, Congress’s need for 
information in furtherance of its legislative function counsels against 
reading Chadha or the Appointments Clause this way.  In Chadha, the 
House of Representatives was attempting to unilaterally alter 
Chadha’s legal rights under federal statutes.44  When a subpoena is 
enforced or contempt is punished, it is pursuant to the general 
legislative powers of Congress, not part of an attempt to alter 
subjects’ legal rights.  Further, any penalty imposed by Congress can 
be tested in federal court, for example by a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus if the subject of an investigation is physically 
detained.45  Subpoena enforcement and contempt punishment 
should thus not be viewed as among those congressional actions to 
which bicameralism and presentment apply.  As far as subpoena 
enforcement is concerned, the long history of legislative enforcement 
of its information-gathering tools and the availability of a judicial 
check counsel against reading the Appointments Clause to prohibit 
 
 44 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–57 (1983). 
 45 See Sky, supra note 43, at 400 n.3; GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 39, at 11. 
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congressional enforcement litigation.46 
In sum, while Grove and Devins are correct that Congress has 
the power, without bicameralism and presentment, to litigate in 
support of congressional investigations, their focus on bicameralism 
leads them astray.  This power is not derived from Congress’s 
unicameral power to make its own rules and punish its members.  
Rather, it is derived from Congress’s core legislative power, the fact 
that no procedural or structural provision of the Constitution 
prohibits congressional litigation to enforce subpoenas and punish 
contempt and the fact that congressional enforcement does not 
threaten to “unduly hamper” the functioning of any other branch of 
government. 
CONCLUSION 
Grove and Devins have presented powerful normative and 
historical arguments against congressional litigation to defend the 
constitutionality of federal statutes, but they have not provided 
sufficient support for their conclusions in the Constitution itself.  
Bicameralism simply does not apply to litigation in support of the 
constitutionality of federal statutes because such litigation is not an 
exercise of the legislative function as defined in Chadha.  Because 
bicameralism or any other procedural or structural provision of the 
Constitution does not apply, the primary separation of powers 
standard that applies to this issue is whether congressional litigation 
in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes threatens the 
ability of another branch to fulfill its constitutional function.  Here 
the answer is easy—litigation does not threaten any of the executive 
branch’s powers, and arises only when the executive branch shirks its 
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.  Any threat to 
the executive branch is further minimized by the fact that Congress 
cannot do anything unilaterally.  Rather, only a court judgment can 
preserve the constitutionality of a federal statute. 
Grove and Devins correctly conclude that Congress has the 
power to litigate to support its subpoenas and punish contempt of 
Congress but not because, as they argue, Article I grants each House 
unilateral power to make rules and discipline members.  Rather, this 
power is derived from Congress’s core legislative function, which 
would be crippled if it had to rely upon the executive branch to 
litigate disputes concerning information gathering and contempt.  
Again, because no structural or procedural provision directly 
addresses Congress’s powers here, the question becomes whether 
congressional action unduly hampers the ability of another branch to 
 
 46 See Marshall, supra note 6, at 785–88 (recounting history of legislative investigatory 
powers dating back to 1689 in Parliament). 
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function.  Although when the subject of Congress’s investigation is 
the executive branch the case here is closer than whether Congress 
may litigate in support of constitutionality, ultimately Congress’s 
interest in effective information gathering for legislative purposes 
outweighs the threat to the executive branch posed by enforcement 
of subpoenas and contempt penalties against executive branch 
officials.  Here again, judicial involvement is reassuring.  When 
Congress litigates to enforce a subpoena or punish contempt, the 
executive branch or other subject can turn to a federal court for 
protection against overreaching. 
Happily, constitutional law coincides with the most normatively 
desirable outcome.  Disabling Congress from litigating in support of 
the constitutionality of federal legislation would in effect greatly 
expand the scope of the President’s veto power to include all laws 
ever passed, and it would shield that power from a two-thirds 
congressional override.  Congress’s only remedy would be 
impeachment and removal, which is not a process the country should 
go through too often.  Rather, allowing Congress to step in when the 
President decides not to defend the constitutionality of a federal law 
allows the President to remain true to the presidential oath of office 
while enabling an appropriate process for determining whether the 
President’s constitutional concerns are well-founded. 
Finally, allowing Congress to litigate to enforce its information 
gathering tools is vital to maintaining an effective legislative process.  
It could cripple Congress’s ability to produce well-informed 
legislation if it had to depend on a potentially hostile executive 
branch to gather information.  A court should not stretch to read the 
Constitution to provide the contrary result. 
